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Board Ethics and Auditor Choice – International Evidence 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines whether firms‟ auditor choice relates reflects the strength of 
board ethics. Using a large sample of firms 132,853 firm year observations from 
forty-six countries around the globe. and controlling for a number of firm- and 
country-level factors, we find that firms in countries where “high board ethical 
values” prevail are more likely to hire a Big 4 auditor. We also find that the relation 
between board ethical values and auditor choice is mitigated by the firm‟s board size. 
These results establish an indirect link between board ethics and financial reporting 
quality through the firm‟s choice of auditor. 
 
Key words: Ethics, board ethics, auditor quality, board size, corporate ethics. 
 
JEL classification: F23; G15; M41. 
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Board Ethics and Auditor Choice – International Evidence 
 
1. Introduction 
Deep public concern over ethical and financial misconduct by the senior management 
and directors of major companies led to the passage of the historic Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act 2002 redefining the roles and responsibilities of corporations and those who serve 
them. The evidence of management rent seeking behaviour and manipulation of 
accounting numbers raised many questions about the values of those at the helm of 
organizations as well as the system of accountability and transparency that exists in 
the corporate world. The Securities and Exchange Commission has since made 
significant changes in the oversight function of public companies. They have also 
asked public companies to disclose the fundamental values by which they operate, and 
by which the conduct of executives is measured.  
Senior management and directors are challenged to examine the "tone at the 
top" of their organizations, and to emphasize ethics and integrity in business decisions 
making processes. Many are aware that the collapse of Enron was preceded by the ill-
advised decision of the company's directors to specifically waive provisions of the 
company's code of ethics. That decision allowed Enron's chief financial officer to 
benefit from transactions involving the company. [The Special Investigation 
Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp (Feb. 1, 2002)]. The precise facts 
of the directors' decisions, reported extensively in the media (but only after the fact), 
led to proposed reforms by the New York Stock Exchange that were modified and 
incorporated in Section 406 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002. This Section requires public 
companies to disclose whether they have a code of ethics and also to disclose any 
waivers of the code for certain members of senior management. The Commission 
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adopted specific rules implementing these requirements in January 2003. [Release No. 
33-8177 (Jan. 23, 2003), Release No. 34-47262 (Jan. 27, 2003),]. The Commission 
approved significant reforms by the NYSE and NASDAQ that, among other things, 
specifically require companies listed on a markets to have codes of ethics applicable 
to all employees, senior management, and directors. [Release No. 34-48745 (Nov. 4, 
2003].  
This paper contributes to the literature on corporate ethics focussing, in 
particular, on „board ethics‟ and we explore the relationship between board ethics and  
firms‟ choice of external auditor. Prior research on the determinants of auditor choice 
provides convincing evidence that, on average, audit quality increases with auditor 
size (DeAngelo 1981; Datar et al. 1991; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1993; Craswell et al. 
1995; Francis and Wang 2008; Hope et al. 2008). High-quality audits serve as useful 
corporate governance mechanism by reducing information asymmetries and agency 
conflicts between the firm and its stockholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Palmrose 
1984; Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Francis and Wilson 1988; Craswell et al. 1995; 
Francis and Wang 2008; Hope et al. 2008). As a consequence, high-quality audits 
lend credibility to accounting information by improving the precision of accounting 
information (Simunic and Stein, 1987; Becker et al. 1998; Hope et al. 2008).  
No prior study examines whether board ethics relates to firms‟ auditor choice. 
Instead, to understand the association between board ethics and financial reporting, 
prior research has focused primarily on the association between culture and the 
quality of firm disclosure (Jaggi and Low 2000; Hope 2003a and Hope et al. 2008). A 
country‟s disclosure requirements can change over time due to legal requirements 
such as the implementation of International Financial Reporting Standards. In addition, 
firm-level disclosure scores are often available for only a limited number of firms 
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from a particular period which further reduces the power of tests (Doupnik and 
Tsakumis 2004; Hope et al. 2008). By examining the relation between board ethics 
and auditor choice, instead of disclosure levels, we can test the role of board ethics on 
auditor choice using a large number of recent firm-level observations from around the 
world. As such, our study extends and complements the accounting literature that 
examines the association between corporate governance and firms‟ auditor choice 
decision. 
Since board ethical values have been shown to influence management 
behaviour and given that auditing can play an important role in resolving agency 
conflicts (Schneider 1987; Fogarty‟s 1992; Roy 1998; Borkowski and Ugras 1998; 
MacDaniel et al. 2001; and Elias 2002), we hypothesize that managers‟ auditor 
choices relate to the strength of board ethical values. We construct a novel measure of 
board ethical values based on the World Economic Forum (2009) corporate ethics 
factors and employ a large sample of 132,853 firm-year observations from 46 
countries. We find that firms are more likely to hire a Big 5/4
1
 auditor if they operate 
in high board ethical value environments. 
We also examine whether the effect of board ethical values on firms‟ auditor 
choice is enhanced if the board is larger. As the body that governs the firm, the board 
of directors‟ has a fiduciary duty “to ensure that a company is run in the ling-term 
interests of the owners, the shareholders” (Monks and Minow 2004). The board fulfils 
two functions: monitoring management and providing expert advice. Both functions 
imply that the board plays a role in the auditor choice decision (MacAvoy and 
Millstein 1999). As a firm‟s operations become more geographically dispersed, local 
managers‟ corporate ethical values are more likely to be influenced by a variety of 
                                                 
1
 Hereafter „Big 4‟. 
 6 
factors (board size, board independence, non-local managers, foreign governments 
and regulations, greater shareholder base, and foreign lenders). Our evidence shows 
that the positive association between board ethics and auditor choice is mitigated by 
the firms‟ board size. Our results are robust to controlling for both country-level 
factors (e.g. investor protection and capital market development) and a number of 
firm-level factors.  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. Most importantly, this 
is the first study to relate board ethics values to firms‟ auditor choice. Since our 
sample is (unusually) large both in terms of number of firms and countries covered, 
our results are representative of a large number of firms and many countries around 
the world. Furthermore, as our empirical tests control for other institutional factors 
(e.g. investor protection) and we still find a strong association between the board 
ethics dimension of corporate ethics and firms‟ auditor size, we conclude that the 
effects of corporate ethics on management‟s audit quality choice is not subsumed by 
other factors discussed in the literature (e.g. related to the investor protection). Finally, 
this study contributes to the literature on determinants of auditor choice by identifying 
board ethics as an important country-level determinant.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 begins with a 
theoretical framework that outlines the expected influences on the auditor choice 
decision. Then, our hypotheses are developed on the basis of this conceptual 
framework.  Section 3 describes the measures for the dependent, independent and 
control variables and the sample selection procedure. Section 4 presents our empirical 
results. Section 5 provides the conclusion. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework and hypothesis development 
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A code of ethics outlines a set of fundamental principles. These principles can be used 
both as the basis for operational requirements (things one must do) and operational 
prohibitions (things one must not do). Typically, a code of ethics is founded on a set 
of core principles or values and is not designed for expedience.
2
 Those subject to the 
code are expected to understand, internalize, and apply the examples in situations the 
code does not specifically address. Organizations expect that the principles, once 
communicated and illustrated, will apply in every case, and that failure to apply the 
principles can be a cause for disciplinary action.  
Regulators internationally and a number of academic studies (Verschoor 1998; 
Webley and Moore 2003) have suggested that a commitment by corporate 
management to follow an ethical code of conduct confers a variety of benefits for 
their decision making processes. For example, Verschoor (1998) found that large 
public companies that were publicly committed to following a code of ethical 
corporate conduct as part of their internal control strategy, had higher performance in 
both financial and non-financial terms. 
A code of ethics and ethical values are important elements of the internal 
control process of public companies (Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 
78).
3
  The failure of a company (and its senior management) to observe the values 
published in its code of ethics is not, in itself, a violation of the federal securities laws. 
However, the recent SEC actions may trigger the requirement to disclose the 
fundamental business values by which the senior management of companies operate. 
More importantly, failure to observe the values set forth in the code may lead to 
                                                 
2
 In contrast to a code of ethics, a code of conduct usually lists required behaviours, the violation of 
which would result in disciplinary action. 
3
 Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 78, issued by the AICPA Auditing Standards Board, 
requires external auditors to perform procedures to understand a company's internal control 
environment, including integrity and ethical values. The Statement notes that the culture of an 
organization, including its ethical values, can affect the strength of all other internal controls. 
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violations of the SEC law (Pitman and Navran 2003). The effectiveness of an ethics 
program and the culture of an organization should be a matter of concern to the Board 
of Directors. In a widely-cited decision, the Delaware Chancery Court has suggested 
that directors who fail to assure that their companies have effective compliance 
programs may have violated their fiduciary duties (Del. Ch. 1996). SEC Chairman 
Donaldson stated that "the most important thing that a Board of Directors should do is 
to determine the elements that must be embedded in the company's moral DNA   . It 
should be the foundation on which the board builds a corporate culture based on a 
philosophy of high ethical standards and accountability." (SEC Chairman, William H. 
Donaldson, 2003).  
The demand for auditing arises from the auditor‟s monitoring role in the 
principle-agent relationship. An agency relationship is a contract under which one or 
more principals engage an agent to perform some services on the principal‟s behalf 
and delegate some decision-making authority to the agent (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). Because principals cannot directly monitor agents behaviour, agents have the 
incentives and opportunity to engage in activities that benefit the agent at the expense 
of principles. In order to minimize such divergences, the principal can establish 
monitoring systems. The financial statement audit is a monitoring mechanism that 
helps reduce information asymmetry and protects the interest of principals, 
specifically, stockholders, by providing reasonable assurance that management 
financial statements are free from material misstatements (Watts and Zimmerman 
1986, Dang 2008; Hope et al. 2008). However the effectiveness of the audit varies 
with the quality of the auditor (Becker et al. 1998).  
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Following DeAngelo‟s (1981) argument that the size of audit firms is 
positively associated with audit quality, many studies use size (vs. other) as the audit 
quality proxy. Many audit quality studies indicate that when audit firm size is used as 
an indicator of audit quality, higher audit quality is associated with less material 
omissions or misstatements in the financial statements. 
External audits play a vital role in financial reporting credibility by providing 
an opinion whether the financial statements confirm with generally accepted 
accounting principles present a true and fair view (Hope et al. 2008; Francis and 
Wang 2008; Abdel-Khalik and Solomon 1988). The ability to detect material error in 
the financial statement is a function of auditor competence, while the propensity to 
correct or reveal the material error is a function of auditor independence from the 
client (Khurana and Raman 2004).  
Auditing is a valuable form of monitoring used by firms to reduce agency 
costs with debt holders and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986; Hope et al. 2008). However, not all audit firms have the same level 
of knowledge and expertise and hence demand for auditing varies based on the quality 
of the auditors. It is assumed that there is some kind of observable economic effect, 
which results from the employment of an audit firm with an average reputation.   
DeAngelo (1981) notes that, in order to assess audit quality, readers of the 
financial statements will have to make three judgements: (i) whether the amount and 
nature of audit work undertaken is appropriate for the particular client company; (ii) 
how technically competent the audit staff are to undertake the work properly; and (iii) 
how independent the audit firm is and hence how likely it is to report any unadjusted 
errors or omissions that it finds. To make these judgements the readers needs to see 
the audit working papers and to interview the key personnel involved in the audit 
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(Moizer 1997). Since this is impossible, an indirect way of assessing audit quality is 
whether auditors have been sued for failing to detect and/or report material 
misstatements. Thus, high quality auditors will be less willing to accept questionable 
accounting practices because if they do so, and later an audit failure is suspected, their 
reputational capital will suffer. 
Consistent with the above arguments, Beatty (1989) argues that the Big 4 have 
sought to differentiate themselves from other auditors by investing more in 
reputational capital and are viewed as providing higher-quality audits based on their 
perceived competence and independence. Big 4 auditors are perceived to be 
competent given their heavy spending on auditor training facilities and programs and 
to be independent by virtue of their size and large portfolio of clients. 
DeAngelo (1981) and Datar et al. (1991) further argue that large and more 
prestigious public accounting firms concerned about protecting their investment in 
reputation capital have greater incentives than other auditors to supply a high-quality 
audit. In addition, Craswell et al. (1995) notes that, although all audit firms must 
comply with minimum professional standards, the largest firms voluntarily invest in 
higher levels of expertise and have incentives to provide higher-quality audits to 
protect their reputations. Overall, these studies generally suggest that audit quality is 
positively related to audit firm size
4
. 
While managers have an incentive to share information with outsiders and 
reduce information asymmetry, poor board ethical values might conflict with such 
incentives. To the auditor, the poor ethical values of a client can translate into higher 
audit risk as the likelihood of the client withholding material information increases. In 
                                                 
4
 A number of studies document that Big 4 auditors provide higher-quality audits (e.g. that they 
constrain earnings management and/or have a positive influence on firm disclosure). Please refer to 
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1993), Craswell et al. (1995), Francis and Krishnan (1999), Reynolds and 
Francis (2000), Hope (2003b), and Khurana and Raman (2004) for further evidence and references. 
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view of the prior studies which show an effect of national culture on managerial 
decisions in various contexts (Ralston et al. 1997; Guiso et al. 2006), we predict that 
high-quality auditors will be more likely to accept an engagement with a firm in high 
board ethical values countries where client-specific risk (and thus litigation risk) is 
likely to be lower (Feltham et al. 1991; Simunic and Stein 1996). Feltham et al. (1991) 
argue that auditors will not offer audit services to high-risk clients without appropriate 
compensation. Furthermore, Simunic and Stein (1996) reason that as client-specific 
risk increases, and with it the risk of auditor litigation, the supply of audit quality may 
decrease. 
Thus, we hypothesize that audit quality relates positively to board ethical 
values. Since auditor size is associated with audit quality, we expect that managers 
from high ethical values propensity are more likely to commit to higher-quality audits 
by choosing a Big 4 auditor. Our first hypothesis (stated in the alternative form) is 
thus: 
H1: There is a positive association between board ethical values and the choice of 
a Big 4 audit firm. 
 
We are primarily interested in the overall effect of board ethics on audit 
quality choice. Thus, H1 is our main hypothesis. However, numerous studies find that 
larger boards are more like to engage in good governance because larger boards are 
more likely to have a great number of quality directors. In this case, high ethical 
values boards will be more likely to have ethical directors whose influence will 
increase as the board, and their representation, becomes larger. If it is true that board 
ethical values affects auditor choice, then the effect of board size should be increasing 
in the extent to which a particular firm is exposed to the behaviours of board members. 
For this reason, the likelihood of choosing high quality auditors is positively 
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associated with the interaction between the level of board ethical values and the size 
of the board. Our second hypothesis is (stated in the alternative form): 
H2: There is a positive association between the interaction of board ethical values 
with board size and the choice of a Big 4 audit firm. 
 
In addition to being interesting in its own right, if H2 is supported by the data, 
we would argue that empirical support for H1 would be less likely to be driven by 
omitted variables. That is, if we observe results consistent with H2, it would further 
increase our confidence in the results and conclusions regarding H1, our main 
hypothesis. 
 
3. Research Design and Sample selection 
To test the effect of board ethics on auditor choice, we regress the Big 4 indicator 
variable on ETHICS (and a number of control variables). We estimate the following 
auditor choice regression model to test our first hypothesis: 
BIG4 = λ0 +   λ1 Ethics + λ2 INV_PRO (or other country- level control variable) + λ3 
SIZE + λ4 LEV + λ5 GROWTH + λ6 CFO + λ7 LOSS + λ8 INVREC_TA + λ9 SHORT 
+ λ10 LONG + fixed effects … ...………………………………………………….… (1) 
 
 
In Eq. (1), BIG4 is an indicator variable equal to one for a Big 4 auditor, zero 
otherwise. Thus, the results would support H1 if the coefficient on ETHICS is positive 
and significant. In the regression, we control for investor protection (or other country-
level factors)
5
 as well as eight firm-level determinants of auditor choice based on 
previous studies (Pierre and Anderson 1984; Simunic and Stein 1987; Copley et al. 
1995; Choi and Wong 2007; Hope et al. 2008).  
                                                 
5
 To address the multicollinearity problem arising from the high correlations among country-level 
variables, we control for each of the five country-level factors one by one.  
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Following Booth and Schulz (2004), we measure ETHICS by the corporate 
ethics of firms‟ index developed by the World Economic Forum (2008).  The measure 
is coded from 1 to 7 with, for example, a value of 1 for the board ethical value index 
signifying that board ethics of firms in that country are among the world worst‟s and 7 
signifying among the best in the world. From Panel B of Table 3 it can be seen that 
for example Finland (6.63), Sweden (6.45) Singapore (6.30) and Norway (6.18) have 
the highest ethics values in our sample.   
The inclusion of investor protection (INV_PRO) controls for the possibility 
that firms in stronger investor protection are more likely to hire a Big 4 auditor (Choi 
and Wong 2007; Francis and Wang 2008; Hope et al. 2008; Houqe et al. 2009). 
Specifically, we use the „„Regulatory Quality (REG)” and “Rule of Law (Law)” 
variables from The World Bank (2006) to proxy for the strength of investor protection 
in a country.  
We further control for several other country-level factors: the level of capital 
market development, ownership concentration, and level of economic development. 
The motivation for considering these country factors is that Big 4 auditor choices 
could be driven by these country level factors rather than the corporate ethics of the 
board (Francis et al. 2003 & 2008; Hope 2003a & 2008; Fan and Wong 2005). We use 
the ratio of the stock market capitalization to gross national product (CAP) from 
World Economic Forum (2008) to proxy for the level of capital market development. 
We use the average percentage of common shares owned by the three largest 
shareholders in the ten largest firms in a given country from La Porta et al. (1998) to 
measure the overall extent of ownership concentration (OWN) as the proxy for the 
level of agency costs in that country. Finally, we measure the level of economic 
development by the gross domestic product per capita (GDP). 
 14 
The firm-level controls are as follows: firm size, measured as the log of 
current year total assets (SIZE); the value of current year‟s short-term accruals 
(SHORT); the value of current year‟s long-term accruals (LONG); the current year-
end inventory and receivables as a percentage of total assets (INVREC_TA); leverage 
measured as the current year-end total liabilities over total assets (LEV); an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one if the firm incurred a loss in the current year, zero 
otherwise (LOSS); cash flow from operations deflated by lagged total assets(CFO);  
and the latest year sales growth (GROWTH).  
SIZE, SHORT, LONG, and INVREC_TA are included based on Simunic and 
Stein (1987), Francis et al. (1999), and Hope et al. (2008). These variables are 
expected to relate to audit complexity and hence the amount of effort an auditor must 
exert to produce a quality audit, which might be associated with firms‟ auditor choice. 
The inclusion of LEV and LOSS are motivated by Pierre and Anderson (1984) and 
Hope et al. (2008). These two variables relate to auditors‟ litigation risk because they 
capture a client‟s (potential) financial distress, which might affect auditor choice. 
CFO is included because it captures a firm‟s need for cash which has been shown to 
be a determinant of auditor choice (Francis and Wang 2008). GROWTH is included 
to control for the potential effect of a firm‟s profitability on auditor choice. In addition, 
Equation (1) is estimated as a fixed effects model with year-specific dummy variables 
to control for systematic time period effects and country dummies to provide 
additional controls for omitted variables that could affect the auditor choice decision. 
For succinctness, the year and country dummies are not reported in the tables. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
To test whether the board size (BOD_SIZE) mitigates the effect of board 
ethical values, we use the firm‟s number of directors in the board.  We then repeat Eq. 
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(1) and add both BOD_SIZE and an interaction term between BOD_SIZE and 
ETHICS (ETHICS*BOD_SIZE). We hypothesize that the coefficient on the 
interaction term will be positive. 
3.1 Sample Selection 
The financial statement data was extracted from the OSIRIS database for the period 
1998-2007. Following prior research (Francis and Wang 2008; Hope et al. 2008; 
Daske et al. 2008), we exclude financial services firms such as banks, insurance 
companies and other financial institutions because of the atypical financial structure. 
We also exclude utility companies because they are regulated and therefore are likely 
to differ from other companies operations. We exclude observations where the 
statements were not audited or where there were missing values for the dependent and 
independent variables under study. Finally we exclude observations that fall in the top 
and bottom 1% of firm level control variables, and those with the absolute value of 
Studentized residuals greater than 3. The trimming procedure produces our sample 
which consists of 132,853 firms-years for the period 1998-2007. The sample selection 
process is summarized in Table 2, and details of the sample and variables used in the 
tests are reported in Table 3. 
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 here] 
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
We begin by presenting descriptive statistics and pair-wise correlations of the 
regression variables. Panel A of Table 3 reports the pooled distribution of the firm-
level regression variables. The overall mean of BIG4 is 0.53, which indicates that 
approximately 53% of observations hire a Big 4 (or its predecessor) auditor in our 
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sample. The mean board size is 8. The mean values of the control variables accord 
with expectations. 
Panel B of Table 3 reports country-level descriptive statistics and the number 
of observations and firms per country. US firms are most heavily represented in the 
sample (n = 47,405), followed by firms in Japan (n = 13,840) and South Korea (n = 
9949). Nigeria (73), Venezuela (102), Colombia (134), and Kuwait (169) have the 
lowest number of observations. Given such variation in sample sizes across countries, 
we conduct a number of sensitivity analyses to address this issue. 
Norway has the highest Big 4 share (94%), followed by Finland (90%), 
Switzerland (90%) and Ireland (90%). China (10%), Egypt (24%), Indonesia (26%), 
and Philippines (31%) have the lowest Big 4 shares. In terms of the board ethics 
measures (ETHICS), Finland (6.63), Sweden (6.45), Singapore (6.30), Norway (6.18), 
and Switzerland (6.17) rank as the most ethical, while Russia (3.26), Venezuela (3.31), 
Argentina (3.46), Philippines (3.51), China (3.71), and the Brazil (3.77) have the 
lowest ethical values.  For the investor protection variable regulatory quality (REG), 
Hong Kong (1.95), Singapore (1.85), the UK (1.76), Ireland (1.75), Finland (1.70) and 
Australia (1.67) have the strongest regulatory quality as per the World Bank (2006) 
measure, whereas Venezuela (-1.35), Nigeria (-.89), Argentina (-.74), Viet Nam (-.49), 
and Russia (-.45) have the weakest regulatory quality. On the other hand for the 
investor protection variable rule of law (LAW), Norway (2.02), Switzerland (1.96), 
Sweden (1.86) and Finland (1.95) have the highest values while Venezuela (-1.39), 
Nigeria (-1.27), Pakistan (-.82) and Peru (-.75) have the lowest as per the World Bank 
(2006) measure. Hong Kong (713.26), Switzerland (280.20), South Africa (240.44) 
and Singapore (221.54) have the highest scores on the CAP index, while Venezuela 
(3.14) and Viet Nam (7.15) have the lowest scores. Colombia (68%), Mexico (67%) 
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and Brazil (63%) have the highest ownership concentration, whereas US (12%), Japan 
(13%), and the UK (15%), have the lowest ownership concentration. 
[Insert Tables 4 here] 
 
Table 4 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients among the regression 
variables. BIG4 is positively correlated (0.284) with ETHICS as hypothesized (p-
value < 0.01 level). This finding provides univariate support for the prediction that 
firms in high ethical values countries are more likely to choose a Big 4 auditor. 
Consistent with Choi and Wong (2007), the correlation between BIG4 and investor 
protection (REG and LAW) is positive and significant. In addition, the correlation 
between BIG4 and the level of capital market development (CAP), and economic 
development (GDP) is positive, while the correlation between BIG4 and the level of 
ownership concentration (OWN) is negative. INV_PRO (REG & LAW) is strongly 
negatively correlated with ETHICS, suggesting that investors are better protected in 
high ethical values firms. While the correlations are consistent with H1, these results 
should be interpreted cautiously as they do not control for differences in firm 
characteristics or for country characteristics which may affect firms‟ auditor choices. 
Consequently, we now turn to the multivariate tests. 
4.2. Multivariate Analysis 
Panel A of Table 5 reports the results of the Logit multivariate regression tests based 
on Eq. (1)
6
. We report six specifications of the regression including each of the 
country-level control variables in turn. Model 1 employs only firm-level control 
variables to ensure that any inference related to ETHICS is not induced by 
correlations with country-level control variables included in the model. Models 2 – 6 
add a control for country-level factors, the investor protection variables (REG and 
                                                 
6
 The results are not sensitive to the alternative use of probit or OLS regressions. 
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LAW), the level of capital market development (CAP), ownership concentration 
(OWN), and economic development (GDP). All regression specifications include year 
and country fixed effects. The (pseudo) R square of the models range from 0.3680 to 
0.4160. Across all six specifications, ETHICS has a significantly positive coefficient 
(p<.01). In other words, controlling for both firm- and country-level factors, the 
choice of a Big 4 auditor is positively associated with the extent of board ethical 
values in the firm‟s country of domicile. 
It is also interesting to note that the effect of board ethical values is not 
subsumed by INV_PRO, the  legal dimension variables, CAP, a measure of the capital 
market development, OWN, ownership concentration (a proxy of agency costs), or 
GDP, a measure of the overall economic development of the country. Thus, we show 
that board ethical values have explanatory power over and above these country- level 
factors. All the country-level control variables are positively associated with Big 4 
auditor choice. With respect to firm-level control variables, SIZE, LEV, CFO, 
SHORT, and LONG are positively associated with Big 4 auditor choice, while 
GROWTH, INVREC_TA and LOSS (controlling for ROE) are negatively related to 
Big 4 auditor choice. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
To address concern that the uneven country representation in our sample 
biases our results towards countries that are more heavily represented, we examine the 
robustness of our results by excluding several countries which have very high 
numbers of observations. Panel B of Table 5 shows that our results are robust even 
when excluding those countries from the regressions. As an additional analysis (for 
brevity the results are not reported), we reran our analysis using country-weighted 
Logit regression, where the weight is inversely proportional to the number of 
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observations per country. The results remain valid.  Finally, to ensure that smaller 
countries with fewer observations do not drive the results, we re-estimated the models 
for the smaller countries in the sample having 200 or less firm-year observations. The 
results are similar to the results reported in Tables 5 both in terms of the sign and 
statistical significance on the test variables of interest. We thus conclude that smaller 
countries do not drive the results. 
In Panel A of Table 6 we show results of tests of whether a firm‟s board size 
(BOD_SIZE) moderates the effect of home country board ethical values (H2). We first 
note that no inferences from testing H1 are affected by the control for board size of the 
firm and ETHICS is significantly related to BIG4 at p<.01 in all models.  
More importantly, the term for the interaction between ETHICS and 
BOD_SIZE is positive and significant for all models. In other words, the positive 
effect of home country board ethical values on the likelihood of hiring a high-quality 
auditor is further enhanced the larger the firm‟s board size. This result is consistent 
with H2. It also provides further support for H1, our main hypothesis that board ethics 
matters. Board ethical values should matter most for firms that are primarily affected 
by domestic concerns. Panel B of Table 6 indicates that our results are robust even 
when excluding countries with the largest number of observations. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
In sum, these regression tests support our hypotheses that firms with high 
board ethical values countries are more likely to hire a Big 4 auditor, and that this 
relation is mitigated by firms‟ board size. 
4.3. Robustness tests 
Although we controlled for a number of firm characteristics, we conduct an additional 
analyses to control for the corporate tax rate in the home country. For example, if a 
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Russian firm derives most of its revenues from operations in Europe or if the firm is 
cross-listed on London Stock Exchange, the firm is less likely to be affected by 
domestic norms–such as the extent of low board ethical values in the country – than 
other, less internationally-oriented, Russian firms. For this reason, we examine if the 
relation between ethics and auditor choice is mitigated by the degree of 
internationalization measured at the country level with the relevant tax rate as the 
proxy. The results are similar to the results reported in Table 5 both in terms of the 
sign and statistical significance on the test variables of interest (with Pseudo R
2
 for all 
six models ranging from 0.370 to 0.418) and our conclusions were not affected (for 
brevity the results are not reported).  
 Secondly, we explored the effect of measuring ETICS as the rank of the World 
Economic Forum (2008) scores rather than the raw scores. For example, is the 
difference between 6.08 and 6.02 twice as great as the difference between 6.05 and 
6.02, at least in terms of the effect of ethics on auditor choice? We obtain virtually the 
same results using ranks as for raw scores (Pseudo R
2
 for all six models ranging from 
0.316 to 0.418 again, for brevity, the results are not reported). 
 Initiated by Kaplan‟s (2001) test of MBA student perceptions of corporate 
ethics (company-benefiting actions vs personal-benefiting actions) we also measured 
board ethics as „individualism‟, Hofstede‟s (1980) second cultural dimension. We 
thus repeat the above tests using this alternative measure of board ethics. Our 
(unreported) results show that the board ethics measure retains its significance at less 
than the 0.01 level, alleviating any potential concerns that our results are specific to 
the choice of measure for the variable ETHICS. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this study, we hypothesize that board ethical values are an important indirect 
determinant of financial reporting quality through the impact on the firm‟s choice of 
auditor. Specifically, we test whether the strength of board ethics in a country 
positively relates to firms‟ choice of a high-quality auditor (Big 4 audit firms). 
Using a large number of firms from 46 countries and a measure of board ethics 
based on the World Economic Forum (2008) corporate ethics values, we find strong 
evidence consistent with this hypothesis: firms with high board ethical values are 
more likely to hire a Big 4 auditor. We further find that the positive effect of home 
country board ethical values on the likelihood of hiring a high-quality auditor is 
mitigated by the extent of the firm‟s board size. These results are robust to controls 
for numerous country-level factors, including investor protection and capital market 
development, and to a number of firm-level determinants of auditor choice. They are 
also robust to a variety of test specifications and alternative measures for board ethics. 
This is the first study to relate board ethics to firms‟ auditor choice behaviours. 
Since our sample is (unusually) large both in terms of number of firms and countries 
covered, our results are representative of a large number of firms around the world. 
We provide strong evidence in support of the emphasis placed on board ethical values 
in Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 section 406. We conclude that the effect of board ethics 
on management‟s auditor choice is not subsumed by other institutional factors 
examined in the literature (e.g. investor protection). 
Finally, our results should be interpreted with the following caveats. First, as 
is common in this line of research, we test for an association between board ethics and 
auditor choice, not the causal effect of board ethics on auditor choice. Despite this 
potential limitation, our results suggest that management‟s auditor choice behaviour 
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(and therefore financial reporting quality) relates to the board ethics values of home 
country, lending support to the basic premise that board ethics influences management 
behaviour (Baumhart 196; Victor and Cullen 1988; Trevino et al. 1998; Sims and 
Keenan 1998; Hunt et al. 1989; Kaplan 2001; Valentine et al. 2001 Madison 2002; 
Vitell et al. 2003; Elias 2004). 
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Table 1: Descriptions of variables 
 
 
Variable                                     Measure                                                  Description                                                       Data Source                                                                                                                                  
 
Dependent variable 
 
 
BIG4 
 
Auditor Quality 
 
 
Dummy variable with the value of 1 if the firm is audited by 
one of the Big 4 auditors and otherwise 0. 
 
 
OSIRIS (2009) 
 
Independent variables 
 
 
Investor Protection 
     (INV_PRO) 
 
Regulatory Quality 
(REG) 
 
 
Measures the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations and promote 
private sector development. 
 
 
The World Bank (2006) 
 
Rule of  Law (LAW) 
 
Measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence. 
 
 
The World Bank (2006) 
 
 
Capital Market 
development 
 
 
Stock market 
capitalization to GDP 
(CAP) 
 
 
Stock market capitalization to GDP index. This indicator is 
the value of listed shares as a percentage of GDP. 
 
The World Economic Forum 
(2008) 
 
Ownership 
 
OWN 
 
The average percentage of common shares owned by the 
 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
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Concentration 
 
three largest shareholders in the 10 largest firms in a given 
country. 
 
Economic Development 
 
 
 GDP 
 
Gross domestic product per capita in US dollars 
 
 
The World Factbook (2009) 
 
Control Variables 
 
SIZE  
 
 
Log of firm total assets       
 
OSIRIS (2009) 
 
LEV 
 
Total long-term debt/Total Assets 
 
 
OSIRIS (2009) 
 
GROWTH 
 
(Sales in year t – Sales in year t-1 ) / Sales in year t-1 
 
 
OSIRIS (2009) 
 
CFO 
 
Cash flow from operations 
 
 
OSIRIS (2009) 
 
INVREC_TA 
 
(Current year inventory + current year Receivable ) / Total 
assets  
 
 
OSIRIS (2009) 
 
LOSS 
 
Takes the value 1 if Net income for the period is negative and 
0 otherwise. 
 
 
OSIRIS (2009) 
 
 
SHORT 
 
Current Accruals scaled by beginning year total assets 
 
OSIRIS (2009) 
 
 
LONG 
 
Long term Accruals scaled by beginning year total assets 
 
 
OSIRIS (2009) 
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Table 2 
Sample selection 
 
Total number of observations for 1998-2007:                                                                      505594 
Less: Observations from countries not in the list of the WEF report (2008)                                 (46298) 
Less: Missing values on dependent and independent variables                                      (292644) 
Less: Financial Institution and regulated firms                                                                              (20522) 
Less: Top and bottom 1% of DACCR accruals                                                                             (11107) 
Less: Observations with │Studentized residuals│>3                                                                      (4425) 
 
Number of observations used in the tests                                                                             132853 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A : Descriptive statistics for firm-level regression variables 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. 1st Quartile Median  3
rd
 Quartile 
BIG4 .53 .499 .000 1.00 1.000 
BOD_SIZE 8.00 5.598 5.00 8.00 12.00 
SIZE 5.1092 .88551 4.4922 5.0923 5.710 
LEV .6017 .25037 .4890 .6432 .7718 
SHORT -.0678 .20902 -.1214 -.0440 .0189 
LONG .0469 .04723 .0169 .0353 .0596 
INVREC_TA .1320 .11832 .0343 .1046 .1948 
GROWTH .2531 .67356 -.0180 .1228 .3129 
CFO .0325 .19752 -.0136 .0561 .1239 
LOSS .31 .462 .000 .0000 1.000 
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Table 3 
 
Panel B: Summary of country-level variables 
Country No.of 
obs. 
BIG4 
(%) 
 
ETHICS 
INV_PRO CAP GDP OWN 
REG 
 
LAW 
Australia 3613 59 6.08 1.67 1.81 118.28 38100 .28 
Argentina 616 65 3.46 -.74 -.58 29.73 14200 .55 
Austria 317 62 6.09 1.53 1.87 48.32 39200 .51 
Belgium 629 53 5.40 1.32 1.45 85.53 37500 .62 
Brazil 2472 66 3.77 .00 -.48 53.28 10100 .63 
Canada 6022 75 5.86 1.53 1.85 123.28 39300 .24 
Chile 1867 80 5.46 1.41 1.15 103.50 14900 .38 
China 7148 10 3.71 -.19 -.40 n.a 6000 n.a 
Colombia 134 33 4.43 .10 -.64 32.13 8900 .68 
Czech Republic 364 46 3.95 .95 .73 29.94 26100 n.a 
Egypt 1971 24 4.34 -.44 .00 74.58 5400 .62 
Finland 639 90 6.63 1.70 1.95 111.15 37200 .24 
France 3730 59 5.42 1.12 1.37 91.82 32700 .34 
Germany 2751 55 6.15 1.39 1.77 48.37 34800 .50 
Hong Kong 876 81 5.82 1.95 1.45 713.26 43800 .54 
India 6587 38 4.19 -.15 .17 70.64 2800 .43 
Indonesia 1313 26 3.77 -.26 -.82 26.52 3900 .62 
Ireland 263 90 5.53 1.75 1.62 60.63 46200 .36 
Israel 1107 40 4.88 .91 .69 103.12 28200 .55 
Italy 1252 86 4.08 .84 .37 48.42 31000 .60 
Japan 13840 73 5.41 1.27 1.40 108.27 34200 .13 
Korea South 9949 36 5.16 .70 .72 86.08 26000 .20 
Kuwait 169 53 4.72 .51 .75 153.89 57400 n.a 
Malaysia 4433 60 5.26 .67 .58 133.89 15300 .52 
Mexico 1063 72 4.35 .43 -.49 33.54 14200 .67 
Netherlands 848 86 6.15 1.65 1.75 102.90 40300 .31 
Nigeria 73 66 3.79 -.89 -1.27 21.33 2300 .45 
Norway 870 94 6.18 1.34 2.02 69.04 55200 .31 
Pakistan 946 45 4.35 -.39 -.82 33.62 2600 .41 
Peru 551 55 3.99 .11 -.75 51.03 8400 .57 
Philippines 796 31 3.51 -.06 -.48 43.61 3300 .51 
Poland 201 47 4.17 .64 .25 35.52 17300 n.a 
Russia 453 56 3.26 -.45 -.91 74.51 15800 n.a 
Singapore 2619 71 6.30 1.85 1.82 221.54 52000 .53 
Saudi Arabia 397 55 4.43 -.02 .17 136.54 20700 n.a 
South Africa 1106 70 4.68 .68 .24 240.44 10000 .52 
Spain 753 86 4.87 1.06 1.10 90.04 34600 .50 
Sweden 1762 86 6.45 1.44 1.86 125.47 38500 .28 
Switzerland 754 90 6.17 1.45 1.96 280.20 40900 .48 
Thailand 2018 72 4.14 .37 .03 62.12 8500 .48 
Turkey 345 32 4.64 .21 .08 36.52 12000 .50 
UAE 189 74 5.30 .80 .67 n.a 40000 n.a 
UK 6461 63 5.83 1.76 1.73 139.22 36600 .15 
USA 47405 61 5.10 1.47 1.57 135.37 47000 .12 
Venezuela 102 88 3.31 -1.35 -1.39 3.14 13500 .49 
 32 
Viet Nam 419 38 4.03 -.49 -.43 7.15 2800 n.a 
 
 
BIG4 = dummy variable, = 1 if firm i is audited by a Big 4 auditor in year t, 0 otherwise. ETHICS = index of 
Corporate Ethics (WEF 2008). INV_PRO is Investor Protection, measured two ways: (1) REG = Regulatory 
quality index (The World Bank 2006). (2) LAW = Rule of Law index (The World Bank 2006). CAP = Stock 
market capitalization to GDP index (WEF 2008). GDP = Gross domestic product per capita in US dollars. (The 
World Factbook 2009). OWN = the average percentage of common shares owned by the three largest 
shareholders in the 10 largest firms in a given country (La Porta et al. 1998). SIZE =natural logarithm of total 
assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. LEV= total liabilities / total assets for firm i in year t. GROWTH = 
sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales in year t. CFO = operating 
cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. LOSS = dummy variable, = 1 if firm i reports 
negative net income in the current year and 0 otherwise. INVREC_TA = current year end inventory and 
receivables as a percentage of total assets. SHORT = current year short term accruals. LONG = current year 
long term accruals. 
 
 33 
Table 4 
Pearson correlation matrix 
 
 
BIG4 ETHICS BOD_SIZE REG LAW CAP GDP OWN 
 
ETHICS*BOD_SIZE 
ETHICS .284
** 
(<.01) 
1        
BOD_SIZE .187
** 
(<.01) 
.113** 
(<.01) 
1       
REG .349** 
(<.01) 
.802** 
(<.01) 
.152** 
(<.01) 
1      
LAW .322** 
(<.01) 
.851** 
(<.01) 
.156** 
(<.01) 
.956** 
(<.01) 
1     
CAP  .169** 
(<.01) 
.381** 
(<.01) 
.116** 
(<.01) 
.470** 
(<.01) 
.416** 
(<.01) 
1    
GDP .314** 
(<.01) 
.658** 
(<.01) 
.166** 
(<.01) 
.917** 
(<.01) 
.903** 
(<.01) 
.437** 
(<.01) 
1   
OWN -.091** 
(<.01) 
-.319** 
(<.01) 
-.098** 
(<.01) 
-.603** 
(<.01) 
-.665** 
(<.01) 
-.151** 
(<.01) 
-.695** 
(<.01) 
1  
ETHICS*BOD_SIZE .234
** 
(<.01) 
.283** 
(<.01) 
.980** 
(<.01) 
.283** 
(<.01) 
.293** 
(<.01) 
.178** 
(<.01) 
.274** 
(<.01) 
-.130** 
(<.01) 
1 
 
Note: p-values are in parenthesis.  
 
BIG4 = dummy variable, = 1 if firm i is audited by a Big 4 auditor in year t, 0 otherwise. ETHICS = index of Corporate Ethics (WEF 2008). BOD_SIZE = number of directors in 
the board of a firm. INV_PRO is Investor Protection, measured two ways: (1) REG = Regulatory quality index (The World Bank 2006). (2) LAW = Rule of Law index (The 
World Bank 2006). CAP = Stock market capitalization to GDP index (WEF 2008). GDP = Gross domestic product per capita in US dollars. (The World Factbook, 2009). OWN = 
the average percentage of common shares owned by the three largest shareholders in the 10 largest firms in a given country (La Porta et al. 1998). 
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Table 5 
Logit regressions testing the relation between auditor choice (BIG4) and Board Ethics 
 
BIG4 = λ0 +   λ1 Ethics + λ2 INV_PRO (or other country- level control variable) + λ3 SIZE + 
λ4 LEV + λ5 GROWTH + λ6 CFO + λ7 LOSS + λ8 INV_TA + λ9 SHORT + λ10 LONG + 
Fixed effects  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Panel A : Logit regressions for pooled sample 
ETHICS 1.043 
(<.01) 
.176 
(<.01) 
.485 
(<.01) 
.672 
(<.01) 
.727 
(<.01) 
1.059 
(<.01) 
REG  1.183 
(<.01) 
    
LAW   .630 
(<.01) 
   
CAP    .006 
(<.01) 
  
GDP     .000 
(<.01) 
 
OWN      1.253 
(<.01) 
SIZE 1.421 
(<.01) 
1.353 
(<.01) 
1.389 
(<.01) 
1.420 
(<.01) 
1.377 
(<.01) 
1.427 
(<.01) 
LEV .576 
(<.01) 
.479 
(<.01) 
.495 
(<.01) 
.452 
(<.01) 
.542 
(<.01) 
.535 
(<.01) 
GROWTH -.099 
(<.01) 
-.099 
(<.01) 
-.096 
(<.01) 
-.092 
(<.01) 
-.099 
(<.01) 
-.099 
(<.01) 
CFO .116 
(.051) 
.273 
(<.01) 
.202 
(<.01) 
.021 
(.728) 
.205 
(.001) 
-.048 
(.423) 
LOSS -.038 
(.088) 
-.104 
(<.01) 
-.062 
(.005) 
-.078 
(<.01) 
-.063 
(.004) 
-.079 
(<.01) 
INVREC_TA -.286 
(<.01) 
-.450 
(<.01) 
-.424 
(<.01) 
-.122 
(.082) 
-.382 
(<.01) 
-.147 
(.038) 
SHORT .419 
(<.01) 
.513 
(<.01) 
.526 
(<.01) 
.202 
(.003) 
.541 
(<.01) 
.091 
(.192) 
LONG 6.753 
(<.01) 
5.666 
(<.01) 
6.323 
(<.01) 
6.567 
(<.01) 
6.500 
(<.01) 
5.902 
(<.01) 
Intercept -13.489 
(<.01) 
-9.393 
(<.01) 
-10.912 
(<.01) 
-11.802 
(<.01) 
-12.102 
(<.01) 
-13.941 
(<.01) 
fixed effects included included included included included included 
Pseudo R
2
 .396 .416 .401 .370 .401 .368 
                     N 132,853 132,853 132,853 132,853 132,853 132,853 
  
Without 
USA 
 
Without 
UK 
 
Without 
Canada 
 
Without 
India 
 
Without 
Japan 
 
Without 
USA, UK, 
Canada, 
India, 
Japan 
Panel B : Logit regressions for sub-sample excluding selected countries 
ETHICS 1.020 
(<.01) 
1.060 
(<.01) 
.977 
(<.01) 
.964 
(<.01) 
.999 
(<.01) 
.793 
(<.01) 
SIZE 1.128 
(<.01) 
1.404 
(<.01) 
1.434 
(<.01) 
1.407 
(<.01) 
1.523 
(<.01) 
1.134 
(<.01) 
LEV .309 
(<.01) 
.586 
(<.01) 
.512 
(<.01) 
.711 
(<.01) 
.650 
(<.01) 
.698 
(<.01) 
GROWTH -.188 
(<.01) 
-.085 
(<.01) 
-.130 
(<.01) 
-.097 
(<.01) 
-.060 
(<.01) 
-.160 
(<.01) 
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CFO .340 
(<.01) 
.128 
(.035) 
.144 
(.019) 
.150 
(.013) 
.063 
(.311) 
.547 
(<.01) 
LOSS -.053 
(.051) 
-.030 
(.186) 
-.076 
(.001) 
-.031 
(.170) 
.065 
(.007) 
.156 
(<.01) 
INVREC_TA -.383 
(<.01) 
-.328 
(<.01) 
-.335 
(<.01) 
-.195 
(.005) 
-.024 
(.748) 
.185 
(.079) 
SHORT .901 
(<.01) 
.465 
(<.01) 
.481 
(<.01) 
.496 
(<.01) 
.459 
(<.01) 
1.451 
(<.01) 
LONG 11.393 
(<.01) 
7.103 
(<.01) 
6.501 
(<.01) 
7.028 
(<.01) 
7.712 
(<.01) 
16.287 
(<.01) 
Intercept -11.914 
(<.01) 
-13.546 
(<.01) 
-13.323 
(<.01) 
-13.058 
(<.01) 
-13.934 
(<.01) 
-11.430 
(<.01) 
fixed effects included included included included included included 
Pseudo R
2
 .353 .394 .398 .364 .432 .326 
       
 
Note: Coefficient p-values are two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and 
country clustering effects using the method in Rogers (1993). For clarity in presentation the coefficients on year 
and country dummies have not been reported.  
 
BIG4 = dummy variable, = 1 if firm i is audited by a Big 4 auditor in year t, 0 otherwise. ETHICS = index of 
Corporate Ethics (WEF 2008). INV_PRO is Investor Protection, measured two ways: (1) REG = Regulatory 
quality index (The World Bank 2006). (2) LAW = Rule of Law index (The World Bank 2006). CAP = Stock 
market capitalization to GDP index (WEF 2008). GDP = Gross domestic product per capita in US dollars. (The 
World Factbook 2009). OWN = the average percentage of common shares owned by the three largest 
shareholders in the 10 largest firms in a given country (La Porta et al. 1998). SIZE =natural logarithm of total 
assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. LEV= total liabilities / total assets for firm i in year t. GROWTH = 
sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 and scaled by sales in year t. CFO = operating 
cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. LOSS = dummy variable, = 1 if firm i reports 
negative net income in the current year and 0 otherwise. INVREC_TA = current year end inventory and 
receivables as a percentage of total assets. SHORT = current year short term accruals. LONG = current year 
long term accruals. 
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Table 6 
 
Logit regressions testing interaction between board ethics (Ethics) and Board Size 
(BOD_SIZE) in explaining auditor choice (BIG4) 
 
BIG4 = λ0 +   λ1 Ethics +   λ2 BOD_SIZE + +   λ3 Ethics*BOD_SIZE + λ4 INV_PRO (or other 
country- level control variable) + λ5 SIZE + λ6 LEV +  λ7 GROWTH + λ8 CFO + λ9 LOSS + 
λ10 INV_TA + λ11 SHORT + λ12 LONG + fixed effects  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Panel A : Logit regressions for pooled sample 
ETHICS .911 
(<.01) 
.223 
(<.01) 
.403 
(<.01) 
.132 
(<.01) 
.729 
(<.01) 
.479 
(<.01) 
BOD_SIZE -.138 
(<.01) 
-.034 
(.028) 
-.132 
(<.01) 
-.421 
(<.01) 
-.069 
(<.01) 
-.432 
(<.01) 
ETHICS*BOD_SIZE .021 
(<.01) 
.001 
(.710) 
.020 
(<.01) 
.073 
(<.01) 
.008 
(.012) 
.076 
(<.01) 
REG  1.138 
(<.01) 
    
LAW   .582 
(<.01) 
   
CAP    .006 
(<.01) 
  
GDP     .000 
(<.01) 
 
OWN      1.277 
(<.01) 
SIZE 1.489 
(<.01) 
1.419 
(<.01) 
1.456 
(<.01) 
1.508 
(<.01) 
1.448 
(<.01) 
1.519 
(<.01) 
LEV .612 
(<.01) 
.512 
(<.01) 
.538 
(<.01) 
.508 
(<.01) 
.579 
(<.01) 
.576 
(<.01) 
GROWTH -.101 
(<.01) 
-.099 
(<.01) 
-.098 
(<.01) 
-.090 
(<.01) 
-.100 
(<.01) 
-.098 
(<.01) 
CFO .215 
(<.01) 
.352 
(<.01) 
.293 
(<.01) 
.131 
(.033) 
.285 
(<.01) 
.064 
(.302) 
LOSS -.041 
(.069) 
-.102 
(<.01) 
-.063 
(.005) 
-.101 
(<.01) 
-.061 
(.007) 
-.107 
(<.01) 
INVREC_TA -.293 
(<.01) 
-.455 
(<.01) 
-.423 
(<.01) 
-.095 
(.187) 
-.378 
(<.01) 
-.128 
(.078) 
SHORT .486 
(<.01) 
.562 
(<.01) 
.582 
(<.01) 
.227 
(.001) 
.587 
(<.01) 
.131 
(.069) 
LONG 6.885 
(<.01) 
5.820 
(<.01) 
6.467 
(<.01) 
6.598 
(<.01) 
6.657 
(<.01) 
5.958 
(<.01) 
Intercept -13.052 
(<.01) 
-9.823 
(<.01) 
-.10693 
(<.01) 
-9.338 
(<.01) 
-12.305 
(<.01) 
-11.329 
(<.01) 
fixed effects included included included included included included 
Pseudo R
2
 .402 .420 .407 .384 .406 .383 
                     N 132,853 132,853 132,853 132,853 132,853 132,853 
  
Without 
USA 
 
Without 
UK 
 
Without 
Canada 
 
Without 
India 
 
Without 
Japan 
 
Without 
USA, UK, 
Canada, 
India, 
Japan 
Panel B : Logit regressions for sub-sample excluding selected countries 
ETHICS .875 
(<.01) 
.945 
(<.01) 
.946 
(<.01) 
.944 
(<.01) 
.729 
(<.01) 
.847 
(<.01) 
BOD_SIZE -.190 -.131 -.078 -.063 -.211 -.092 
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(<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) (<.01) 
ETHICS*BOD_SIZE .025 
(<.01) 
.019 
(<.01) 
.007 
(.019) 
.007 
(.028) 
.038 
(<.01) 
.005 
(.131) 
SIZE 1.232 
(<.01) 
1.478 
(<.01) 
1.527 
(<.01) 
1.473 
(<.01) 
1.555 
(<.01) 
1.265 
(<.01) 
LEV .433 
(<.01) 
.625 
(<.01) 
.554 
(<.01) 
.728 
(<.01) 
.656 
(<.01) 
.683 
(<.01) 
GROWTH -.173 
(<.01) 
-.086 
(<.01) 
-.128 
(<.01) 
-.100 
(<.01) 
-.069 
(<.01) 
-.162 
(<.01) 
CFO .495 
(<.01) 
.236 
(<.01) 
.254 
(<.01) 
.233 
(<.01) 
.140 
(.029) 
.582 
(<.01) 
LOSS -.035 
(.207) 
-.033 
(.151) 
-.079 
(.001) 
-.033 
(.153) 
.058 
(.017) 
.139 
(<.01) 
INVREC_TA -.351 
(<.01) 
-.339 
(<.01) 
-.346 
(<.01) 
-.214 
(.003) 
-.043 
(.570) 
.007 
(.951) 
SHORT .955 
(<.01) 
.539 
(<.01) 
.546 
(<.01) 
.554 
(<.01) 
.531 
(<.01) 
1.378 
(<.01) 
LONG 11.489 
(<.01) 
7.263 
(<.01) 
6.579 
(<.01) 
7.161 
(<.01) 
7.880 
(<.01) 
15.612 
(<.01) 
Intercept -11.424 
(<.01) 
-13.222 
(<.01) 
-13.480 
(<.01) 
-13.179 
(<.01) 
-12.689 
(<.01) 
-11.929 
(<.01) 
fixed effects included included included included Included included 
               Pseudo R
2
  .369 .400 .406 .369 .437 .340 
       
 
Note: Coefficient p-values are two-tail and based on asymptotic Z-statistic robust to hetroscedasticity and 
country clustering effects using the method in Rogers (1993). For clarity in presentation the coefficients on 
year and country dummies have not been reported.  
 
BIG4 = dummy variable, = 1 if firm i is audited by a Big 4 auditor in year t, 0 otherwise. ETHICS = index of 
Corporate Ethics (WEF 2008). BOD_SIZE = number of directors in the board of a firm. INV_PRO is Investor 
Protection, measured two ways: (1) REG = Regulatory quality index (The World Bank 2006). (2) LAW = Rule 
of Law index (The World Bank 2006). CAP = Stock market capitalization to GDP index (WEF 2008). GDP = 
Gross domestic product per capita in US dollars. (The World Factbook 2009). OWN = the average percentage 
of common shares owned by the three largest shareholders in the 10 largest firms in a given country (La Porta et 
al. 1998). SIZE =natural logarithm of total assets in $ thousands for firm i in year t. LEV= total liabilities / total 
assets for firm i in year t. GROWTH = sales growth rate, defined as the sales in year t minus sales in t-1 and 
scaled by sales in year t. CFO = operating cash flows for firm i in year t scaled by lagged total assets. LOSS = 
dummy variable, = 1 if firm i reports negative net income in the current year and 0 otherwise. INVREC_TA = 
current year end inventory and receivables as a percentage of total assets. SHORT = current year short term 
accruals. LONG = current year long term accruals. 
 
 
 
